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THE DANGER OF BOOTSTRAP FORMALISM 
IN COPYRIGHT 
Alfred C. Yen* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I am reticent about identifying the "worst" intellectual property 
case ever. Although there is value in discussing superlatives (even 
negative ones), I have a general sense that preoccupation with rank 
ordered lists has become counterproductive. l I will, however, use 
the space so kindly afforded me by this law journal to discuss West 
Publishing Company v. Mead Data Central, Inc.,2 a case that 
exhibits an unfortunate form of legal reasoning that I call "boot-
strap formalism."3 , 
Intuitively, "bootstrap formalism" is the expansive reading of a 
legal claim without adequate doctrinal or policy support. Bootstrap 
formalism is formalism because it uses the logical implications of 
legal rules to reach a given result.4 I have added the term 
• Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. Copyright 1998 by Alfred C. Yen. 
t Consider two examples that legal academics know only too well-the U.S. News and 
World Report annual ranking of law schools and the Chicago·Kent Annual Survey of 
Scholarship. Both rankings offer interesting and valuable information. However, it is only 
too easy for people who should know better to become overly concerned with how they or 
their institutions fare by these idiosyncratic measures of quality. 
2799 F.2d 1219, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801 (8th Cir. 1986) !hereinafter West v. Mead). I 
am not the first writer to write critically about this case. For other analyses, see L. Ray 
Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizir18 the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law 
Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REv. 719 (1989); James H. Wyman, 
Comment, Freeing the Law: Case Reporter Copyright and the Universal Citation System, 24 
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 217 (1996). 
3 Bootstrap formalism may well be troubling if used in other areas of the law as well. 
However, I will restrict my claim made here to copyright law since West II. Mead is a 
copyright case. 
, For discussions of formalism, see Catharine Pierce Wells, Holmes on Legal Method: The 
Predictive Theory of Law as an Instance ofScienti{ic Method, 18 S. ILL. U. L. J. 329, 329-30 
(1994) (describing Langdellian formalism as based on logical deduction, resting on distinctly 
legal premises, and finding that proper application of legal reasoning insures a uniquely 
correct result for every legal case); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and 
the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 179, 180-81, 184-
185 (1987) (defining formalism as "the use of deductive logic to derive the outcome of a case 
from premises accepted as authoritative" and describing positive economic analysis of law, 
453 
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"bootstrap" because bootstrap formalism stretches legal rules to the 
point that they offer little support for the result reached. Thus, an 
opinion exhibits "bootstrap formalism" when 1) it recognizes a legal 
claim by relying on a plausible, but logically questionable, applica-
tion of doctrine and 2) the opinion has little, if any, discussion of 
the relevant policy issues that might otherwise support its strained 
application of doctrine. 
Bootstrap formalism is particularly undesirable in copyright 
because it paves the way for making copyright rights broader than 
they should be. Copyright rights are clearly limited in their scope 
by statute,5 and these limits exist because unlimited copyright 
rights would not optimally advance the progress of science and art, 
nor would they be consistent with a proper balance between the 
natural rights of authors and those who read and use copyrighted 
works.6 Ideally, copyright doctrine would contain rules that clearly 
define the limits required by copyright theory. If that were the 
case, formalism would be an excellent method for avoiding the 
overextension of copyright law. Following the rules would be 
tantamount to following copyright's theoretical limits. However, 
copyright doctrine is notoriously vague. It is possible to interpret 
copyright very broadly, but it is not at all certain that such broad 
interpretations properly limit copyright's scope.7 Formalism 
as the modem exemplar of formalism in common law); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 
YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (generally supporting the idea that legal reasoning as applied to rules 
controls the outcome of cases). 
6 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (defining the scope of copyright rights) and § 106 (specifying 
the rights granted to a copyright holder). 
8 The primary theoretical basis for American copyright law is the belief that copyright 
provides a necessary incentive for the production of desired works. See U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, d. 8 (authorizing Congress to pass copyright legislation "to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts."); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., 499 U.S. 340, 18 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275 (1991) (implicitly recognizing the importance of limiting the scope 
of copyright in order to promote the public interest). A secondary theoretical basis is the 
belief that copyright is a property right that the creator of a work deserves as a matter of 
natural law. For explanations of how these theories require limits on the scope of copyright 
law, see Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 
OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990); Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright Law: 
The Challenges of Consistency, Consent and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1343 
(1989). 
7 For example, it is possible to interpret copyright law so that almost any kind of 
borrowing constitutes copyright infringement. See Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment 
Perspective on the Idea I Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and 
Feel", 38 EMORY L.J. 393 (1989). 
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therefore provides a poor method for avoiding the overextension of 
copyright because the formal plausibility of a particular interpreta-
tion of copyright provides little comfort about the propriety of the 
result reached. Bootstrap formalism therefore creates the danger 
of carelessly expanding copyright law to the detriment ofthe public 
interest. 
II. WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY V. MEAD DATA CENTRAL 
The case of West Publishing Company u. Mead Data CentralS 
provides an excellent example of bootstrap formalism and its 
dangers. The facts of the case are quite familiar. 
For years, the plaintiff West compiled and published the written 
opinions of state and federal courts in its "National Reporter 
System."9 Each of West's volumes contained the text of the 
opinions, headnotes, synopses and citations.lO West also checked 
the accuracy of citations in the opinions and assigned opinions to 
particular volumes in its system, depending primarily on a court's 
identity (e.g., state v. federal) and geographic location. ll West 
claimed copyright in each volume of the series.12 
The defendant Mead Data Central owned and operated the 
LEXIS on-line legal research service.1s LEXIS competed directly 
against West in the publication of case reports.14 In June of 1985, 
Mead announced plans to add "star pagination" to the LEXIS 
service by inserting page numbers from West's National Reporter 
System into LEXIS case reports. 15 This would tell LEXIS users 
the precise West page number on which the text of reported 
opinions appeared. IS Without star pagination, LEXIS users who 
desired pinpoint cites had to look the relevant opinion up in an 
actual West reporter. The addition of star pagination obviated the 
need for such action. 17 
8 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986). 
9Id. at 122l. 
10Id. at 1221.22. 
II Id. 
12 Id. at 1222. 
13Id. 
"Id. 
'·Id. 
18Id. 
17 Id. at 1222, 1228. 
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West recognized that star pagination might reduce demand for 
its case reporters arid brought suit,18 claiming that . Mead's 
addition of star pagination infringed West's copyright in its case 
reporters.19 West moved for a preliminary injunction, which was 
granted by the District Court.20 Mead then appealed to the 
Eighth Circuit, which affirmed in an opinion that rested almost 
entirely on a formalistic application of copyright doctrine with no 
significant discussion of copyright policy.21 
III. WEST V. MEAD AS BOOTSTRAP FORMALISM 
A. A FEW COPYRIGHT BASICS 
The identification of West v. Mead's bootstrap formalism starts 
with a brief review of the basic doctrine governing the scope of 
copyrightable subject matter and the specific rights protected by 
the copyright law. 
Section l02(a) of the Copyright Act grants copyright protection 
only to "original works of authorship. ,,22 Courts have interpreted 
this phrase to mean works whose creation involves a modest level 
of creativity in their selection and arrangement of otherwise 
uncopyrightable things.23 Thus, a book is copyrightable because 
its text is the creative selection and arrangement of otherwise 
uncopyrightable individual words. Anthologies of works and 
compilations of facts are also copyrightable, as long as their 
selection and arrangement involves that same minimal level of 
creativity.24 However, the facts contained in a compilation may 
18 Id. at 1228. 
19 Id. at 1222. 
20 Id. 
21Id. 
22 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
23 Feist v. Rural Telephone Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
24 See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1994); Feist, 499 U.S. at 349; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 547 (985) ("the creation of a nonfiction work, even a 
compilation or pure fact, entails originality"); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 505 n.3, 20 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191, 1193-94 n.3 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing copyright in anthologies); 
Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 863, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 762 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(discuSSing the originality requirement). For more in depth analysis, see Alfred C. Yen, The 
Legacy of Feist: Consequences of tM Weak Connection Between Copyright and the Economics 
of Public Goods, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1343 (1991). . 
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not be copyrighted because, according to the Supreme Court, people 
do not creatively author facts. 25 
Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act further limits the scope of 
copyright protection by specifically excluding from protection 
certain items, regardless of whether they might be "original works 
of authorship." This list includes ideas, methods of operation, and 
discoveries.26 The Act excludes these items because the free 
dissemination of ideas and processes assures a good supply of raw 
material for discussion and future creative efforts.27 
Finally, Section 106 of the Copyright Act sets out the specific 
rights owned by copyright holders. Contrary to popular belief, not 
every use or reference to a copyrighted work results in infringe-
. ment. Instead, copyright owners control only the rights to repro-
duction, the creation of derivative works, public display, public 
performance, and distribution.28 
B. WEST V. MEAD'S USE OF COPYRIGHT DOCTRINE 
The doctrines laid out above make the weakness of the claim 
against Mead quite apparent. Although West clearly has copyright-
able material in its reporters (i.e. the headnotes and synopses of 
the cases), the items borrowed by Mead are of doubtful copyrightab-
ility. The LEXIS offerings at issue were the full text opinions of 
judicial decisions. West could not possibly claim copyright in those 
opinions because West did not author them. As for the provision 
of star pagination, it would seem that Mead had simply reported an 
uncopyrightable fact (i.e. pinpoint cites) to its subscribers. Even if 
one argued that Mead had borrowed the sequencing of West's 
pagination, it is hard to see how starting with page number one 
and continuing in sequence amounts to copyrightable author-
ship.29 
25 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 347. See also Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 
1365, 1369 (5th Cir. 1981). 
28 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). 
21 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50; Landsbergv. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 
F.2d 485, 488, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1140, 1142 (2d Cir. 1984). 
28 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). 
29 See Feist, 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (denying copyright to the alphabetical ordering of names 
in a phone book). 
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The Eighth Circuit's response" to these problems amounts to a 
clever, but strained, application of copyright doctrine. The court 
denied that West's claim depended on copyright in facts or the 
Arabic numbering system.30 Instead, the court stated that West's 
selection and arrangement of cases was sufficiently creative to 
support copyright and based its analysis on whether star pagina-
tion somehow infringed copyright in that arrangement.31 
In concluding that star pagination did infringe West's selection 
and arrangement of cases, the court noted that a LEXIS user could 
use star pagination to reproduce an entire West volume. The user 
would do this by viewing the first case in a West reporter through 
LEXIS. Star pagination would then reveal the fmal page number 
of the first case, and by implication the page on which the next case 
would start. The process would then be repeated over and over 
until the user had reconstructed the identity and sequencing of all 
the cases in a given West reporter.32 The court went on to state 
that even if this reconstruction were not possible, infringement 
would still occur because star pagination would "enable LEXIS 
users to discern the precise location in West's arrangement of the 
portion of the opinion being viewed. ,,33 
Even ifone accepts the court's assertion that West's selection and 
arrangement of cases is copyrightable,34 the logical weakness of 
the court's reasoning is easy to see. The court appears to be stating 
that star pagination infringes the copyright holder's right to make 
copies of a copyrighted work.35 However, Mead never makes the 
purportedly infringing copy because, as the court notes, the copy 
would be made only if a LEXIS user took specific purposeful steps 
30 West, 799 F.2d at 1227. 
SlId. 
82 [d. at 1227-28. 
33 Id. at 1227. 
84 One could easily dispute whether West's selection and arrangement of cases is 
sufficiently original to support copyright. After all, West's selection includes all published 
opinions, and that is hardly original. As for West's arrangement, division by state, 
geography and jurisdiction does not seem terribly creative or original either. See Feist, 499 
U.S. at 362 (denying copyright because plaintiffs selection and arrangement was ordinary 
and "garden variety"). 
815 The court never identifies the reproduction right specifically, but its claim that a 
LEXIS user could recreate the selection and arrangement of a West v9lume follows the 
contours of a claim about reproduction rights. 
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to accomplish the task.36 If Mead itself never commits the act of 
infringement, it is hard to see how provision of star pagination to 
LEXIS users amounts to the same thing. Indeed, the true infringer 
would appear to be the LEXIS user who used LEXIS to reproduce 
a West volume.37 
The court's claim that the mere provision of jump cites consti-
tutes infringement is equally weak. As noted earlier, the provision 
of jump cites appears to be the straightforward communication of 
facts, and facts are clearly not copyrightable subject matter.3S The 
court's response appears to be that the provision of a single jump 
cite would be permissible, but that Mead's provision of all jump 
cites constitutes the appropriation of West's entire arrangement of 
cases.39 There are two possible ways to interpret this argument. 
First, the argument could mean that Mead's provision of all jump 
cites allows the reproduction of West's selection and arrangement 
of cases. If this is the correct interpretation, all of the objections 
previously laid out apply. 
Second, the argument could mean that Mead has infringed West's 
copyright in a compilation of the numbers assigned to each page of 
text. This assertion has a number of serious problems. As an 
initial matter, it is not at all clear that West ever created such a 
86 West, 799 F.2d at 1227.28. 
37 Perhaps West could have argued (and it did not do so) that the provision of star 
pagination made Mead liable for the user's infringement on either a vicarious liability or 
contributory infringement theory. However, this claim would also have had serious 
problems. First, either theory requires that some user actually make the infringing copy, 
and there was no evidence that any user had ever done so. Second, defendants will not be 
held liable for contributory infringement unless they know that an infringement is likely to 
occur, and the cost of reproducing a West volume in the manner suggested makes it highly 
unlikely that such reporductions will occur. See West, 799 F.2d at 1227 (noting that the 
expense would make reproduction unlikely); Religious Tech Ctr, v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 
1361, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (1995) (discussing contributory liability). Third, vicarious 
liability is imposed only if the vicariously liable defendant has control over the behavior of 
the infringing actor, and Mead did not have such control over its users. See Shapiro v. 
Green, 316 F.2d 304, 307, 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 275 (1963) (discussing vicarious liability), 
Religious Tech Ctr., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (discussing same). Fourth, the fact that LEXIS and 
star pagination were susceptible to numerous noninfringing uses makes contributory liability 
highly unlikely. See See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 220 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665 (1984) (declining to find vicarious or contributory infringement where 
the consumer might use the product to make unauthorized copies). 
38 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
39 West, 799 F.2d 1228·29. 
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compilation. Although West assigned a number to each page of 
text, it never collected those assignments and presented them in a 
coherent fashion. There is no work entitled "Page Number 
Assignments of the West Reporter System." Additionally, even if 
the necessary compilation exists, it does not embody the modicum 
of creativity required to support copyright. After all, West simply 
takes the first page of each volume and starts with the number one, 
followed by the second page with the number two, and so on. This 
is precisely the same sort of ordinary arrangement that failed to 
support copyright in Feist.40 Finally, even if the compilation 
somehow supported copyright, Mead did not borrow the copyright-
able aspects of the compilation. Copyright·subsists in the creative 
selection and arrangement of a factual compilation.41 West's 
decision to report all the page numbers of its case reporters is not 
creative (indeed, it represents no selection at a11), so Mead's copying 
of those same page numbers cannot lead to infringement. Thus, 
the arrangement of West's page numbers is the only possible basis 
for infringement, but LEXIS does not present cases (and therefore 
pages) to Lexis customers in the same order as West's case 
reporters do. Mead is therefore unlikely to have borrowed anything 
copyrightable from West. 
C. THE WEAKNESS OF WEST V. MEAD AND THE PROBLEMS OF 
BOOTSTRAP FORMALISM 
The foregoing analysis shows that West v. Mead stands on a 
logically strained application of the copyright doctrine. The court's 
opinion claims that the rules and principles of copyright doctrine 
compel the result reached when there are very strong arguments 
to the contrary. When one considers the fact that courts grant 
preliminary injunctions only when there is "at least a reasonable 
likelihood of success on the merits,»42 the court's decision seems 
even weaker. At the very least, this case was not one that 
reasonably favored the plaintiff. 
<II Feist, 499 U.S. 340 (finding factual compilation of white pages uncopyrightable in part 
because the alphabetical' ordering of the names was not original). 
<. See supra note 23 and accOmpanying text. 
42 See Atari Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 613,214 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 33 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) (setting forth standard for 
granting preliminary ir\iunctions). 
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The dubious nature of the Eighth Circuit's formal reasoning 
raises questions about whether the court decided West u. Mead 
correctly. To be sure, formal reasoning alone can provide strong 
justification for a judicial decision, so the objection here is not with 
the court's reliance on formalism per se. However, when a court 
applies rules in a way that "pushes the envelope" of acceptable 
interpretations, as the Eighth Circuit did in West u. Mead, formal-
ism provides a weak justification because the eyebrow raising 
nature of the court's reasoning signals an error in outcome, and not 
a correct decision. Stretched interpretations of doctrine may be 
correct, but it is difficult to justify them on the basis of formal 
reasoning alone. Something else, perhaps an appeal to the policy 
behind a set of legal rules, is necessary. 
The West u. Mead opinion nicely illustrates how bootstrap 
formalism can harm the public interest. The court clearly under-
stood that its decision would protect West's position as the 
dominant supplier of case reports. Star pagination would obviate 
the need for some consumers to purchase printed West reports. 
Preventing star pagination would therefore preserve West's market 
position or allow West to collect a license fee from Mead Data in 
return for those sales.43 
However, the mere possibility that West would lose sales of its 
case reporters is not, in and of itself, a reason to stretch copyright 
doctrine so that West's competitors become copyright infringers. As 
many have described, it is copyright's offer of a limited monopoly 
in an author's creative work that encourages an author to produce. 
This implies that copyright is sensibly interpreted to create and 
protect only competitive advantages in the exploitation of works 
created by authors. It makes no sense to protect competitive 
advantages in things not created by authors because those 
competitive advantages provide little, if any, incentive to produce 
new authorship. This explains why the copyright. statute protects 
only "original works of authorship."" 
Consider now the sources of West's market advantage in the sale 
of case reporters. The typical West reporter contains summaries of 
the cases, headnotes, and references to West's key numbering 
43 West, 799 F.2d at 1228. 
44 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (emphasis added). 
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system. Consumers sometimes purchase West reporters to enjoy 
the benefits of these items. However, these items are not the only 
reasons that a consumer might buy West case reporters. At least 
nine states, five federal circuit courts, and ten federal district 
courts require citation to the West National Reporter System.45 
Moreover, citation rules promulgated in The Bluebook: A Uniform 
System of Citation (the "bluebook") generally require primary or 
parallel citation to the West National Reporter System.46 Lawyers 
therefore face the practical requirement of buying West reporters 
in order to cite cases properly. 
Brief reflection shows that copyright sensibly protects only the 
first of these competitive advantages. West clearly created its 
summaries, . headnotes and key numbering system. Copyright 
ought to protect the economic advantages that flow to West from 
the sale of these items because it is precisely those advantages that 
encourage West to create and disseminate creative authorship. If 
West were to stop putting its summaries, headnotes and key 
numbering references in its case reporters, the competitive 
advantage discussed would largely disappear. Consumers would 
have little reason to prefer a West reporter over another reporter. 
The texts of the reported opinions would be the same. 
~ The states requiring citation to West's National Reporter System are Delaware, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississipppi, Oklahoma and Tennesse. DEL. SUP. CT. RULES 14(g); 
IOWA RULES APP. PRoc. 14; KY ST RCP 76. 12(4)(g); MISSISSIPPI SUP. CT. 28;, OK CT. RAND 
P II Rule a.5(C); TENN CT. RULES, R. OF APP. P. 27(h); NY CPLR Rule 5529(e); WA R RAP 
10.4(g). The Federal Circuit Courts requiring such citation are the D.C., First, Third, 
Eleventh and Federal Circuit Courta of Appeal. See GEN. RULES OF THE U.S. CT. OF APP. 
FOR THE DIST. OF COL. CIR. ll(b); RULES OF THE U.S. CT. OF APP. FOR THE FIRST. CIR. Rule 
Loc.R.28.1; RULES OF THE U.S. COURT OF APP. FOR THE THIRD. CIR. 21(1)(A)(i); RULES OF THE 
U.S. CT. OF APP. FOR THE ELEVENTH CIR. 28-2(j); RULES OF THE U.S. CT. OF APP. FOR THE 
FEn. Cm. 28(e). The Federal District Courts requiring such citation are the Central District 
of California, Eastern District of California. District of Delaware, District of Nevada. Western 
District of Oklahoma, Eastern District of Oklahoma, Northern District of Oklahoma, Eastern 
District of Tennessee, Middle District of Tennessee, and Eastern District of Washington. See 
LocAL RULES FOR THE CENT. D. OF CAL. 3.9.3; LocAL RULES FOR THE EASTERN DIST. OF CAL. 
134(d); LocAL RULE FOR THE DIST. OF DEL. 3.2C(6); LOCAL RULES FOR THE DIST. OF NEV. 
130.4(b); LocAL RULES FOR THE WEST. DIST. OF OK l3(E); LocAL RULES FOR THE EAsT. DIST. 
OF OK. 13(e); LOCAL RULES FOR THE NORTH. DIST OF OK. 14.E; LoCAL RULES FOR THE EAST. 
DIST. OF TENN. 3.7.4; LoCAL RULES FOR THE MIDDLE. DIST. OF TENN. 8(c)(3); LocAL RULES 
FOR THE EAST. DIST. OF WA. 7(g)(1). See also Wyman, supra n. 2, at 229-230 (explaining how 
litigants are required to cite to West's National Reporter System.). 
48 See The Bluebook Uniform System ofCuation, table T.1 (16th Ed. 1996). 
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By contrast, West did not create the rules and conventions that 
require litigants to cite West reporters. Therefore, it makes no 
sense for copyright to protect economic advantages that flow to 
West from these requirements. Regardless of whether West's 
reporters contain summaries, headnotes or key numbering 
references, consumers still have to buy West case reporters because 
there is no other way to obtain the cites they have to use. Main-
taining this economic advantage through copyright therefore 
enriches the West Publishing Company without providing any 
incentive for the creation and dissemination of authorship. 
Consumers are locked in, no matter what West does. 
The foregoing analysis provides the necessary framework to 
determine whether West v. Mead's bootstrap formalism served the 
public interest. If the decision prevented others from selling or 
distributing West's case summaries, headnotes and key numbering 
references, then the decision served the public interest. If, on the 
other hand, the decision converted requirements about the form 
and method of citation into a West monopoly over the sale of case 
reporters and the provision of legal cites, then the decision did not 
serve the public interest. Of course, it is abundantly clear that 
West sued Mead because it did not want LEXIS users to obtain 
official cites without buying West reporters. Mead never offered 
any of West's summaries, headnotes or key number references on 
LEXIS, so there is no way that the Eighth Circuit's decision 
preserved West's monopolies over those items. Thus, the only thing 
accomplished by the West v. Mead decision was the preservation of 
the competitive advantage West enjoyed simply because it pub-
lished case reports from which courts direct litigants to cite. West 
v. Mead's bootstrap formalism therefore harmed the public inter-
est.47 
.7 Some may argue that West might have stopped providing case reports without 
protection from LEXIS' competition, and that the Eighth circuit correctly decided the case. 
There are many reasons to doubt this conclusion. First, the print market for case reporters 
remained unchanged and vital. Even though on-line research has taken away some demand 
for printed case reports, many lawyers and libraries still maintain printed case report 
collections. Second, West itself can compete for its own share of the on-line case report 
market, and it has by providing the Westlaw service. Moreover, West can use the 
competitive advantage it owns in its summaries, headnotes and key numbering system 
against others in this market. Third, it is doubtful whether copyright incentives are 
necessary at all to ensure the provision of case reports. Courts have always been reluctant 
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IV. CONCLUSION - LEARNING FROM THE PROBLEMS OF WEST 
The mistake in the West u. Mead opinion is clear. The opinion 
uses bootstrap formalism to justify a copyright claim with practical-
ly no analysis of the copyright policy or public interest issues at 
stake. By doing so, the opinion uses copyright law to protect 
economic advantages that bear little relation to the objectives of 
copyright law, thereby harming the public interest. 
The court's mistake is particularly interesting and important to 
note because, although the Eighth Circuit probably did not realize 
it at the time, West v. Mead offers an early glimpse of the analyti-
cal problems courts will face in the coming electronic information 
age. West enjoyed overwhelming dominance in the market for case 
reports, but new technology offered competitors an opportunity to 
challenge West. The on-line provision of case reports allowed 
LEXIS customers to have access to huge numbers of cases without 
having to devote significant physical space to libraries. Also, 
computerized research tools made on-line research more convenient 
than searching for cases in printed reporters. West understandably 
perceived the threat to its economic position and sued to protect 
itself. 
Without question, the story written by West and Mead will be 
retold many times in the years to come. The coming information 
age relies heavily on the use, reuse and recycling of information, 
some of it copyrighted material. Moreover, the centerpiece of this 
age, the Internet, operates by literally making and distributing 
copies of copyrighted material.48 All of this use, reuse, recycling 
to grant monopolies in case reporting. See West, 799 F.2d at 1224-26; see also Wheaton v. 
Peters, 33 U.S. 591,668 (8 Pet.) 8 L.Ed. 1055 (1834) ("no reporter has or can have any 
copyright in the written opinions delivered by this court; and that the judges thereof cannot 
confer on any reporter any such right"); Robert Berring, On Not Throwing Out the Baby: 
Planning the Future of Legal Information, 83 CALIF. L. REv. 615, 618 (995). See also 
AMERICAN AsSOCIATION OF LAw LIBRARIES' GoVERNMENT RELATIONS POLICY (1992) 
(regarding the dissemination of government information). Nevertheless, case reports have 
always been available. 
<8 Andy Johnson Laird, The Anatomy of the Internet Meets the Body of the Law, 22 U. 
DAYTON L. REv. 465, 469 (1997); Trotter Hardy, Computer RAM "Copies": A Hit or Myth? 
Historical Perspectives on Caching as a Microcosm ofCurren.t Copyright Concerns, 22 DAYTON 
L. REv. 423, 452 (1997); Kenneth D. Suzan, Comment, Tapping to the Beat of a Digital 
Drummer: Fine Tuning U.S. Copyright Law for Music Distribution on the Internet, 59 ALB. 
L. REv. 789, 796 (1995). 
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and copying makes it easy for those who own intellectual property 
to make claims against those exploiting new information technolo-
gy. Without question, some of those claims will be justified. At the 
same time, however, it is important to realize that "novel" claims 
that stretch the envelope of copyright (like West's claim against 
Mead) should not be blithely accepted as clever adaptations of old 
principles to new facts. Indeed, it is precisely those claims that 
present the possibility of bootstrap formalism that harms the public 
interest. In those situations, courts need to scrutinize the claims 
being advanced to see if they are justified. If they fail to do so, the 
mistake of West will be multiplied, and consumers as well as 
producers will pay higher prices in a slower and poorer information 
age. 
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